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FOREWORD
In this monograph, Dr. Lukas Milevski explores the
fact that grand strategy is accepted by academics as a
concept, without any firm agreement on what that concept is or the logic that supports it. Indeed, it is vital to
understand this logic, regardless of whether one pins it
to the label “grand strategy” or to any other label that
may be available.
Dr. Milevski begins his monograph with a discussion of various competing visions of grand strategy
as he works his way through the literature to identify
the question of combining military and non-military
power in war as the most fundamental building block
of grand strategy. Yet, in recent decades, this vital component has been less prominent in the literature than
other perspectives have been. Given the crucial context
of war for grand strategy, the author moves on to the
well-understood topic of the foundations and logic of
military power. Annihilation is one pole of that logic in
which military force may be used decisively to crush
the adversary and bring about a quick end to the war.
Its opposite is attrition, a longer and slower whittling
process that transpires until the enemy can no longer
bear the costs of war. Such considerations inevitably
mark the wartime environment in which non-military
power may be wielded.
Dr. Milevski then shifts track to consider the various logics of non-military instruments in peacetime,
from economic sanctions to financial sanctions and
propaganda, all the better to realize the changes which
such instruments themselves undergo when employed
in an adversarial context and alongside active military power. Finally, he combines the logics of military
and non-military power in war to conclude that this
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combination is inherently attritional, as it is only in
a war of attrition that non-military instruments have
relevance. Dr. Milevski ends by considering Russia’s
so-called hybrid warfare and China’s three warfares,
concluding that they, too, follow this same logic; their
main innovations are in how this logic is ordered in
time.
By providing the first thorough exploration of the
logic of grand strategy, Dr. Milevski’s illuminating
monograph will be of great interest and value to those
who think about meaningfully combining military and
non-military power in war, as well as to those who are
responsible for doing so in practice.

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.
Director
Strategic Studies Institute and
U.S. Army War College Press
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SUMMARY
In 1992, Lawrence Freedman posited that:
The view that strategy is bound up with the role of force
in international life must be qualified, because if force is
but one form of power then strategy must address the
relationship between this form and others, including
authority.1

This is necessarily true, as force never has been, is
not, and never will be the sole instrument for achieving political consequence—even in war, although its
primacy in a wartime context should not be doubted.
Freedman’s assertion has gone largely unnoticed in
strategic studies. Despite the regular invocation of
definitions of strategy, which incorporate non-military
as well as military instruments, the West still experiences significant trouble combining these instruments
in practice. Russian hybrid warfare came as a shock
to Western scholars and practitioners of strategy, as
well as policymakers, despite the enormous quantities of ink spilled in writing about grand strategy. This
monograph seeks to respond to Freedman’s challenge
by examining the conceptual logic of grand strategy,
an idea that is often considered the intersection of military and non-military forms of power.
These days, grand strategy is casually taken for
granted as a concept, even though there exists no academic consensus on what it actually is, or the conceptual logic underpinning the idea. In part, this inherently
contradictory condition stems from the resurgence of
interest in the idea of grand strategy since the end of
the Vietnam War, and particularly, since the end of the
Cold War. To address Freedman’s challenge, one must
emphasize the instrumental logic, the use of multiple
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instruments of power, which, rarely ever seriously discussed, implicitly or explicitly underpins all modern
interpretations of grand strategy.
To understand the essential character of grand
strategy is vital for all practitioners of strategy, particularly those with the global reach of the U.S. Army,
because to embark upon a grand strategic conflict
encompassing all instruments of power is implicitly to
make a fundamental choice concerning what Clausewitz considered the most vital decision in war.
The first, the supreme, the most far-reaching act of
judgment that the statesman and commander have to
make is to establish . . . the kind of war on which they are
embarking; neither mistaking it for, nor trying to turn it
into, something that is alien to its nature.2

The choice to pursue grand strategy and exercise the
full breadth of instrumental power is implicitly a judgment that the war will be attritional, which, in turn,
necessarily must affect the design of military operations as they fit into the larger concept of how strategists anticipate the achievement of success in war.
Beyond the meaning of this choice purely for the practice of strategy, the choice also affects the way that the
grand strategy and the war are communicated to the
public or other audiences, in terms such as the duration of the conflict, expectations about the utility of certain courses of action, or the costs involved.
The first section lays out competing visions of
grand strategy: multi-instrumentality used to be at the
forefront of grand strategy, but a focus on overarching
visions and decisions has assumed the mantle of grandness in the concept from the latter half of the Cold War
to the present day. This development has resulted in
a dearth of theoretical inquiry into how productively
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to use multiple forms of power in combination. Moreover, the original emphasis on the unique environment
of war formerly had concentrated the concept, a focus
that is now lacking.
Having established the significance of studying
the instrumental logic of combining various forms of
power in war, this monograph proceeds to explore the
logic of military strategy, which is the baseline logic to
which all other forms of power must necessarily relate
in wartime. Annihilation is one pole of that logic, in
which military force may be used decisively to crush
the adversary and bring about a quick end to the war.
Its opposite is attrition, a longer and slower process of
whittling until the enemy can no longer bear the costs
of war.
Compared to military force, the logic of non-military power is poorly understood in general, although
well-understood in the particular. Economic sanctions,
for example, may be studied according to one or more
of three logics: signaling; as an independent instrument
of coercion; and as a constraining force on the target. Of
these logics, most are not relevant to the wartime environment, leaving constraining force as the only viable
logic. Once military and non-military power are combined, the aggregate logic necessarily turns attritional,
as it is only in the context of a longer, slower wearing
down that non-military power can have any strategic
relevance to the adversarial contest (i.e., by allowing
one belligerent to impose artificial limits upon the enemy’s resources, which may then be reached through
military attrition).
The attritional logic of grand strategy is then contrasted with Russia’s so-called hybrid warfare and
China’s three warfares, which both also combine military and non-military power. The major significant
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difference between Western grand strategy on the one
hand and Russian hybrid warfare and China’s three
warfares on the other hand is the temporal dislocation
of the attritional element in combining military and
non-military power. Rather than occurring simultaneously with the application of military force, as in Western grand strategy, the attritional elements precede
military operations and substantially alter the operating environment, primarily by weakening the enemy
prior to hostilities. However, despite differences
between the Russian and Chinese combinations and
Western grand strategy, their attritional logic nonetheless persists.
Both security studies and strategic and defense
studies as academic fields and as policy professions
have been emphasizing the multiplicity of forms of
power and their relevance for decades. Ideas such as
the comprehensive or whole-of-government approach
have played a significant conceptual part in wars, as
in Iraq and Afghanistan. Despite this, hardly anyone
has sought to explore the actual logic, which must
necessarily underpin such real-world practice. Being
able creatively and effectively to combine military and
non-military power enhances one’s ability to alter the
future, as the Russian example in Crimea clearly indicates. That same example also testifies to the West’s
shortcomings at actually doing so. It is past time to
redress this glaring gap in the West’s academic and
policy grasp of how to combine military and non-military power in a single effort. After all, when U.S. strategists embark upon grand strategy rather than simply
strategy, they are essentially, if implicitly, anticipating
and committing to a longer war, with implications
for the deployment and employment of the one element on which the whole logic of combining multiple
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instruments of power most often rests—Landpower in
war.
ENDNOTES - SUMMARY
1. Lawrence Freedman, “Strategic Studies and the Problem of
Power,” in Lawrence Freedman, Paul Hayes, and Robert O’Neill,
eds., War, Strategy, and International Politics: Essays in Honour of Sir
Michael Howard, Oxford, United Kingdom: Clarendon Press, 1992,
p. 290.
2. Carl von Clausewitz, On War, Michael Howard and Peter
Paret, eds. and trans., Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press,
1984, p. 88.
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GRAND STRATEGY IS ATTRITION: THE LOGIC
OF INTEGRATING VARIOUS FORMS OF POWER
IN CONFLICT
In 1992, Lawrence Freedman posited that:
The view that strategy is bound up with the role of force
in international life must be qualified, because if force is
but one form of power then strategy must address the
relationship between this form and others, including
authority.1

This is necessarily true, as force never has been, is
not, and never will be the sole instrument for achieving political consequence—even in war—although its
primacy in a wartime context should not be doubted.
Freedman’s assertion has gone largely unnoticed in
strategic studies. Despite the regular invocation of
definitions of strategy, which incorporate non-military
as well as military instruments, the West still experiences significant trouble combining these instruments
in practice. Russian hybrid warfare came as a shock
to Western scholars and practitioners of strategy, as
well as policymakers, despite the enormous quantities of ink spilled in writing about grand strategy. This
monograph seeks to respond to Freedman’s challenge
by examining the conceptual logic of grand strategy,
an idea that is often considered the intersection of military and non-military forms of power.
These days, grand strategy is casually taken for
granted as a concept, even though there exists no
academic consensus on what it actually is or the
conceptual logic underpinning the idea. In part, this
inherently contradictory condition stems from the
resurgence of interest in the idea of grand strategy
since the end of the Vietnam War, and particularly,
since the end of the Cold War. To address Freedman’s
1

challenge, one must emphasize the instrumental logic,
the use of multiple instruments of power, which,
although rarely ever seriously discussed, implicitly
or explicitly underpins all modern interpretations of
grand strategy, as well as Freedman’s basic question.
The first section of this text lays out competing visions
of grand strategy and why it remains vital to focus on
the mutual compatibility of military and non-military
power in war. This interpretation of grand strategy—
indeed any interpretation of strategy that combines
military and non-military means—utilizes a conceptual logic that is inherently attritional. This attritional logic stems from combining the particular and
disparate logics of military and non-military power,
along with the implicit assumptions which underpin
their respective employment during war. This line of
argument will be logically explained, from the annihilative versus attritional modes of military power
to the inherently cumulative effects of non-military
power, as will the form that these two manifestations
of power take when combined in a single, strategic
effort—warfare. The attritional logic of grand strategy
is thereafter contrasted with Russia’s so-called hybrid
warfare and China’s three warfares, which both also
combine military and non-military power. Despite the
significant differences between the Russian and Chinese combinations and Western grand strategy, the
attritional logic nonetheless endures.
To understand the essential character of grand
strategy is vital for all practitioners of strategy, particularly those with the global reach of the U.S. Army,
because to embark upon a grand strategic conflict
encompassing all instruments of power is implicitly to
make a fundamental choice concerning what Clausewitz considered the most vital decision in war.
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The first, the supreme, the most far-reaching act of
judgment that the statesman and commander have to
make is to establish . . . the kind of war on which they are
embarking; neither mistaking it for, nor trying to turn it
into, something that is alien to its nature.2

The choice to pursue grand strategy and exercise the
full breadth of instrumental power is implicitly a judgment that the war will be attritional, which, in turn,
necessarily must affect the design of military operations as they fit into the larger concept of how strategists anticipate the achievement of success in a war.
Beyond the meaning of this choice purely for the practice of strategy, the choice also affects the way that the
grand strategy and the war are communicated to the
public or other audiences, in terms such as the duration of the conflict, expectations about the utility of
certain courses of action, or the costs involved.
For decades, both security studies and strategic and
defense studies, along with academic fields and practitioner and policy professions, have been emphasizing
the multiplicity of forms of power and their relevance.
Ideas such as the comprehensive or whole-of-government approach have played a significant conceptual
part in past or ongoing wars, as in Iraq and Afghanistan. Consequently, the theme of how these instruments may be combined productively has been close
to the heart of the use and practices of U.S. Landpower
for nearly 2 decades. The Army is rarely, if ever,
employed alone to achieve a desired objective. Despite
this, few have sought to explore the actual logic which
must necessarily underpin such real-world practice,
and by which one could comprehend how the various
instruments of national power must all fit together in
a single, concerted, strategic effort.
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In most wars, Landpower is and will be the foundation on which the whole logic rests in application,
and to which this logic must therefore refer. Being
able creatively and effectively to combine military and
non-military power enhances one’s ability to alter the
future to one’s own benefit, as the Russian example in
Crimea clearly indicates. That same example also testifies to the West’s shortcomings at actually doing so,
as the West was taken entirely by surprise not only in
the fact of the Russian action but also in the details of
how it played out. If a potential threat is multidimensional in the variety of instruments employed, then
one must certainly understand the basis upon which
these instruments may work together to comprehend
their ultimate effect upon one’s ability to act strategically. It is past time to redress this gap in the West’s
academic and policy grasp of how to combine military
and non-military power in a single effort—regardless
of whether or not the resulting ideas and practice are
called grand strategy.
COMPETING VISIONS OF GRAND STRATEGY
Prior to discussing the question of associating
grand strategy with attrition, one must examine
instrumentality and multi-instrumentality in grand
strategy. The idea of integrating various forms of
power in war used to be one of the dominant interpretations of grand strategy embraced by various
strategists, from Julian Stafford Corbett to Edward
Luttwak and Colin Gray. This logic of grand strategy
stemmed from the development of maritime strategic thought in the late 19th and early 20th centuries,
before which grand strategy only narrowly applied
to the military. Only through the influence of the two
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major maritime theorists, Alfred Thayer Mahan and,
particularly, Julian Stafford Corbett, did grand strategy expand to include non-military instruments. This
conceptual change reflected the particular characteristics of sea power and the maritime environment, a
space in which the contest between empires could take
on other than a solely military dynamic. As Mahan
argued, “The diplomatist, as a rule, only affixes the
seal of treaty to the work done by the successful soldier. It is not so with a large proportion of strategic
points upon the sea.”3 Far-flung islands—indeed,
entire colonial territories—could be bought, sold, and
bartered for rather than won through battle, such as
the Louisiana Purchase from France and Alaska from
Russia, or the Red Sea town of Assab by an Italian
company in 1869, which became the first Italian colonial territory in 1882.
Once the codification of maritime strategy had
begun, theorists such as Corbett were obliged to recognize this breadth. Corbett’s notes for lectures to British
naval officers at the Royal Naval College in Greenwich, United Kingdom, reflected this realization.
First there is Grand Strategy, dealing with whole theatre
of war, with planning the war. It looks on war as a
continuation of foreign policy. It regards the object of the
war & the means of attaining it. It handles all the national
resources together, Navy, Army, Diplomacy & Finance.4

This conceptual breadth thereafter became a bedrock feature of most interpretations and reinterpretations of grand strategy. British military theorist John
Frederick Charles Fuller broadly defined grand strategy as “The transmission of power in all its forms,
in order to maintain policy,” although he would also
maintain that it was purely a peacetime concept.5 His
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contemporary, Basil Liddell Hart, offered a definition
of grand strategy which remains a favorite among
those who write about grand strategy today. Liddell
Hart identified that the role of grand strategy was “to
co-ordinate and direct all the resources of a nation, or
band of nations, towards the attainment of the political object of the war—the goal defined by fundamental policy.”6
Contemporaneously with Fuller and Liddell Hart,
American interpretations of grand strategy underwent a similar, but even more expansive, broadening.
Edward Mead Earle’s definition of grand strategy also
continues to be popular, albeit less so than that of Liddell Hart. He suggested that:
The highest type of strategy—sometimes called grand
strategy—is that which so integrates the policies
and armaments of the nation that the resort to war is
either rendered unnecessary or is undertaken with the
maximum chance of victory.7

Great breadth has also marked many of the more recent
interpretations of grand strategy which emerged from
the latter half of the 1970s onward. Barry Posen, for
instance, argues that, “A grand strategy must identify
likely threats to the state’s security and it must devise
political, economic, military, and other remedies for
those threats.”8 Edward Luttwak also places the combination of military and non-military means at the
center of grand strategy.
For at the level of grand strategy, the interactions
of the lower, military levels, their synergisms or
contradictions, yield final results within the broad setting
of international politics, in further interaction with the
nonmilitary transactions of states: the formal exchanges
of diplomacy, the public communications of propaganda,
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secret operations, the perceptions of others formed by
intelligence official and unofficial, and all economic
transactions of more than purely private significance.9

Colin Gray similarly argues, “If the concept of grand
strategy is to have intellectual integrity, it has to admit
a necessary connection to military force as a, not the
only, defining characteristic.”10
A final defining characteristic of this interpretation
of grand strategy is that it revolves explicitly around
war, save for outliers, such as J. F. C. Fuller’s notion.
As Luttwak argues concerning the practice of grand
strategy, “The boundaries of grand strategy are wide,
but they do not encompass all the relationships of all
participants in the totality of international politics.”
Grand strategy occurs only in the presence of armed
conflict, rather than being pure statecraft at all times.11
This fixation anchored the logic of grand strategy, as
the context of war imposed certain restrictions and
limitations on the assumptions and understandings
which underpinned the logic of grand strategy.
This qualification for fixing grand strategy to war
is significant. Peace and war are substantially differing contexts, and those who act in either do so holding
opposing assumptions about fundamental questions,
such as how to achieve one’s policy goals. When
combining military and non-military power in war,
non-military power must be integrated into and benefit the main military effort. Non-military power must
bow to the basic facts of war and warfare. Combining
the two in peace requires military power to be integrated into non-military power and act along the lines
required by diplomacy and statecraft, an altogether
different task. Corbett believed that one of the purposes of theory is to make concepts communicable:
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“Every man concerned must have been trained to
think in the same plane; the chief’s order must awake
in every brain the same process of thought; his words
must have the same meaning for all.”12 The basic frame
of mind, fundamental standards of effectiveness, and
foundational forms of power vary greatly between
peace and war. It is both conceptually and practically difficult to incorporate the logics of military and
non-military power within one single context, without
then also expanding the concept of grand strategy into
a wholly other context, where the logics differ again.
Unfortunately for the state of the concept, the
instrumental logic inherent in combining multiple
forms of power, whether in war or in war and peace,
has never been systematically explored. It remains,
as Liddell Hart perceived it throughout his writing
career, “for the most part terra incognita—still awaiting
exploration, and understanding [italics in original].”13
Despite the lack of real development, the question of
multi-instrumentality used to be the defining element
that distinguished grand strategy from strategy, the
new aspect that made grand strategy grand. This conception of grandness has become mundane, at least
since as early as the 1960s, when the U.S. Air Force
Manual 11-1, Glossary of Standardized Terms, succinctly
encapsulated this mundanity: “national strategy—See
strategy.”14 The manual’s entry for strategy differentiated between military strategy—a formulation which
would once have been considered redundant—and
national strategy.
strategy—The art and science of developing and using
political, economic, psychological, and military forces as
necessary during peace and war, to afford the maximum
support to policies, in order to increase the probabilities
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and favorable consequences of victory and to lessen the
chances of defeat.
military strategy—The art and science of employing
the armed forces of a nation to secure the objectives of
national policy by the application of force, or the threat
of force.
national strategy—The art and science of developing and
using the political, economic, and psychological powers
of a nation, together with its armed forces, during peace
and during war, to secure national objectives [emphasis
and italics in original].15

The idea of mixing military and non-military forms of
power together in the pursuit of political goals came
to be accepted as commonplace, a natural evolution
which required little thought. Ubiquitous in practice,
this interpretation of grand strategy does not hold
an intellectual monopoly. No longer appearing sufficiently grand to carry the weight of grand strategy, in
academic discussions, this interpretation is an increasingly marginalized understanding of grand strategy.
Although the interpretation implicitly remains a major
feature of contemporary definitions of grand strategy,
it is rarely discussed. Why, then, should one privilege
the interpretation over the competing logics of grand
strategy as espoused by others? To answer this question, one must first elaborate upon the term’s conceptual competition.
In recent decades, this multiple-instrument logic
of grand strategy has been overshadowed by an alternative conception of grand strategy, one that places
the concept above policy itself, to manage it, often on
time scales which may be measured in decades or centuries. This latter understanding of grand strategy is
especially popular in the United States. Earle’s definition of grand strategy fits within this “overarching”
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understanding of grand strategy as well, as it explicitly referred to the integration of policy, as well as
the armaments (in a broad sense, the means) of the
nation. Paul Kennedy popularized this interpretation
in the early 1990s: “A true grand strategy was now
concerned with peace as much as (perhaps even more
than) with war. It was about the evolution and integration of policies that should operate for decades, or
even centuries.”16 Alternatively, as another commentator of that time suggested:
The natural inclination is to view strategy as supporting
policy, rather than the reverse. . . . But strategy is more
than this: it is the grand design, the overall mosaic into
which the pieces of specific policy fit. It provides the key
ingredients of clarity, coherence and consistency over
time.17

This conception of grand strategy requires the ability
to maintain political coherence even when crossing
boundaries, such as peace to war, and later to peace
again.
The great American grand strategic debate of the
1990s wholeheartedly adopted this impression of overarching grand strategy. The vocabulary of grand strategy suddenly revolved around arcane terms, such as
neo-isolationism, selective engagement, primacy, and
cooperative security, which were joined a decade later
by additional labels, such as offshore balancing and
liberal interventionism.18 These labels all represented
individual “grand strategies” which sought to impose
on U.S. policy coherence which each author believed
to have been missing since the end of the Cold War
and the success of the policy of containment. According to the proclivities of each individual author, the
coherence to be imposed varied thematically. Some
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preferred to return to an isolationist posture, others to
take advantage of the U.S. unipolar moment to impose
its primacy upon the world and so forth.
Most subsequent writers on the topic further
extrapolated from this basic understanding of grand
strategy:
It should be clear to the reader that ‘grand strategy’ and
‘foreign policy’ are not synonymous. Grand strategy, the
conceptual framework, is necessarily broader than foreign
policy, the political actions of the state in international
relations.19

To write treatises espousing the virtues of a specific
grand strategy has become an academic cottage industry in the United States. Daniel Drezner has flippantly
but accurately commented upon the popularity of
writing on grand strategy.
Grand strategies are easy to devise—they are forwardlooking, operate in generalities, and make for great book
tours. Whenever a foreign policy commentator articulates
a new grand strategy, an angel gets its wings.20

Once one begins discussing grand strategy at this
level, the content of the debate becomes essentially
ideological.21 William Martel suggested:
Scholars and policy makers must understand that they
cannot articulate a coherent grand strategy without first
achieving a consensus on the political goals that shape
the state’s policies and allowing policy makers to garner
broad public support for that goal.22

This is both quixotic and unproductive because it
lowers the level of debate to that of first political principles—that is, ideology. As Marc Trachtenburg trenchantly noted:
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To my mind, one of the main problems with the idea of
grand strategy is that it places a premium on a certain
kind of intellectualizing. It is never enough just to call
for a particular course of action; one has to justify the
strategy by rooting it in a certain theory about what is at
the bottom of international politics, or at least what is at
the heart of the situation one is trying to deal with. Since
the strategy needs to be simple and all-encompassing,
there is a tendency for the theory to be framed in rather
grandiose terms—that is, for the theory to overdefine or
to misdefine the problem, and in any case to misdirect
attention away from the real issues that policy should
focus on.23

The resultant debate among those with varying
ideologies produces heat and angst, but no light or
agreement. Questions concerning the instrumental
logic of integrating various forms of power remain,
but the focus has shifted away from them in favor of
various big, overarching ideas. Even one of the most
recent samples of American grand strategic literature
focuses on selling the big idea and, even though an
extensive discussion of the instrumental logic necessary for implementing the big idea is provided, it still
plays a secondary role to, and is a part of, the idea of
salesmanship.24
The concept of grand strategy under this interpretation is no longer strategic. Rather, (grand) strategy
and policy have swapped roles as compared to classical strategy, from which modern strategic studies is
derived. Now, “In effect, strategy tells us what policies
to pursue, whereas foreign policy is about the how to
do so [italics in original].”25 Grand strategy, as currently envisioned by many, drives policy and operates constantly—in peace as in war. It determines the
way in which a country is to interact with the rest of
the world, usually without reference to any particular
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purpose, and thus, ostensibly, until the end of time.
The original underlying concept of strategy is now
lost, along with its instrumental logic (and ensuing
practice) of military power in the peculiar and unique
context of war.
Strategy is designed to make war useable by the state,
so that it can, if need be, use force to fulfil its political
objectives. One of the reasons we are unsure what
constitutes war is that we are unsure about what strategy
is or is not. It is not policy; it is not politics; it is not
diplomacy. It exists in relation to all three, but it does not
replace them.26

Unlike any other instruments or circumstances in
political life, individually or in combination, the instrumentality of violence and the context of war are both
vital and unique to strategy. The grandiose expansion
of grand strategy into real responsibility and authority
in peace as well as war, plus the increasing apparent
banality of combining multiple forms of power, result
in losing sight of this uniqueness.
Finally, this expanded interpretation of grand
strategy is derived from a fundamental misunderstanding of its conceptual patron saint: containment,
often invoked as the great and successful example
of grand strategy working as a framework for foreign policy, which, despite both domestic and foreign crises, endured for decades to guide U.S. foreign
policy throughout the Cold War. Yet, containment was
not a framework. Rather, it was a way or method of
achieving a particular goal—the collapse of the Soviet
Union—together with an explanation of the underpinning instrumental logic. It was the how, not the what
or the why. It endured despite ideational challenges
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because all alternatives—rollback, the prospect of
nuclear war, surrender—were instrumentally worse.
What these grand strategists have mistaken as authority
over policy was actually a normal mutual feedback loop
between the desired political end and the chosen ways
to achieve that end within an ever evolving geopolitical
context. What these grand strategists have mistaken as a
four decade-long grand strategy was simply a constancy
of purpose within an international environment which
constrained the action realistically suitable for achieving
that purpose to a single option.27

This constancy of purpose was ensured by an enduring enemy—containment persisted because the Soviet
Union persisted.
Some have sought to defend this notion of grand
strategy. Paul Miller was concerned that “If grand
strategy does not include consideration of the ultimate
or political aims of national security, then it is unclear
what differentiates grand strategy from strategy [italics
in original].” Yet, at the same time, he himself noted
that mainstream concepts of grand strategy varied
from strategy in four ways, two of which represented
the grand, unifying idea and its subjugation of policy.
The other two outstanding features were the instrumental breadth of grand strategy and its peacetime
role.28 This alone suggests that there remains enormous and significant room for grand strategy to exist
as a concept, even without directing policy through
the conception of a big idea.
To privilege the older and now neglected instrumental emphasis of grand strategy over the newer
and prevalent ideological understanding would be to
bring the grand strategy debate closer to policy relevance. Examination of instrumental logic is of eternal
concern to policymakers and strategists, as the basic
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logic remains constant, regardless of political views
or the party in power—although political authorities
may believe otherwise. Ideology, on the other hand,
both sidelines and is easy to sideline. To a favorable
audience, it is preaching to the choir; to an unfavorable audience, it is misguided noise. The basic logic of
instrumentality inherent in combining multiple forms
of power in grand strategy can—and should—be elucidated. Yet no one has yet seriously taken up Freedman’s challenge regarding the relation of military
power to other forms of power.
Due to the shift of focus in the study of grand strategy from multi-instrumentality to overarching grand
visions and decisions, the gap in both the literature
and the understanding of grand strategy, never filled
even by the older literature on grand strategy, became
fossilized as no longer sufficiently vital to study in its
own right. This has relegated even the relatively few
discussions of grand visions which do include consideration of instrumental logic on an ad hoc basis with
little to no general theoretical foundation. The resulting hole in our understanding of grand strategy must
be plugged.
THE FOUNDATIONS AND LOGIC OF MILITARY
POWER
To understand the role which non-military power
may play in grand strategy, one must begin by comprehending military power and its role in war. War is
adversarial, which breeds a particular kind of thinking. Adversarial ways of thinking are unique and
readily distinguishable from peaceful, even if competitive, thinking. Clausewitz described the basic tenor of
adversarial thinking:
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So long as I have not overthrown my opponent I am
bound to fear that he may overthrow me. Thus I am not in
control: he dictates to me as much as I dictate to him. . . .
If you want to overcome your enemy you must match
your effort against his power of resistance. . . . But the
enemy will do the same.29

In such circumstances, with often critical political
issues gambled on the outcome of war, one must use
the most promising instruments at one’s own disposal.
This is military power. It is why violence is a defining
element of war. It is why Clausewitz stated that battle
is the basic means of war: because combat is the clash
of opposing military forces.
The logic of military power is well-trodden
ground. Military power may be employed to attrite
the enemy, to exhaust him, or to annihilate him. Usually this logic is represented as a spectrum with only
two opposing poles, annihilation versus attrition or
exhaustion, which are often treated as synonyms. In
the first decades of the 20th century, German military historian Hans Delbrück was among the first to
distinguish between strategies of annihilation (Niederwerfungsstrategie) and exhaustion or attrition (Ermattungsstrategie).30 This basic model of two opposing
strategies has remained popular ever since its conception, albeit it is occasionally modified by splitting attrition and exhaustion into two distinct poles to create
a tri-polar model of military strategy, where attrition
emphasizes the accumulation of physical and material
damage and exhaustion the accumulation of moral
and psychological harm.
Strategies of annihilation posit that a swift, overwhelming victory in which the enemy’s army is
wholly defeated leads to the collapse of the enemy’s
will to fight and his quick, subsequent surrender.
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Napoleon’s campaigns at the height of his power in
1805-1807 were the early models for this. Helmuth von
Moltke the Elder’s campaign against Austria-Hungary in 1866, which culminated at the battle of Königgrätz, also became an instant classic in the historical
canon of the strategy of annihilation. Such campaigns
have become the military ideal and are often given the
brazen label of “decisive.”
This strategic ideal is two-dimensional. Strategies of annihilation are expected to be relatively
inexpensive, in both human and material cost. They
are expected to be fast. Both dimensions must combine synergistically; because the campaigns are fast,
they will also be cheap. These strategies demonstrate
the strategic conceit that military power is capable of
delivering fast, approximately desirable results—and
the truth of this has been demonstrated throughout
history, at least within favorable strategic circumstances. This is the basic promise of military action,
although only sometimes does it actually bear fruit in
real strategic practice.
Yet, strategies of annihilation are difficult to achieve
in practice. Cathal Nolan’s recent tome, The Allure of
Battle, testifies to this difficulty, despite the siren song
of annihilation and its purported decisiveness, which
result in short wars. Too many factors in war, from
politics to technology, tactics, the adversarial learning
process, etc., can impede the successful achievement of
a truly decisive, war-winning battle of annihilation.31
Nevertheless, despite the difficulty, such decisive battles have occurred—or appear to have occurred—just
often enough in military history not only to entrance
many strategists but also to prove that they can and do
occur. It remains the ideal military logic. It is also still
practicable—as long as the appropriate circumstances
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in the strategic environment are met. When the requisite circumstances are not met, then strategies of
annihilation and their resultant battles fold into larger
strategies of attrition. Battle therefore becomes, in
Nolan’s phrase, mere “accelerants of attrition.”32
Strategies of attrition or exhaustion are the unloved
step-sibling of the favored strategy of annihilation.
Annihilation creates the inability to carry on. Attrition
and exhaustion produce either (or both) the improbability
of victory or the unacceptable cost. Attrition tends to be
associated with the destruction of military forces while
exhaustion refers to the gradual degradation of a broader
range of national capabilities (military forces, economic
or industrial power, will, etc.).33

Attrition or exhaustion works by wearing down the
enemy, materially or psychologically, and often both
at once, through the accumulation of damage from
various actions toward some identified limit. This
logic has the potential to become terribly expensive in
both men and materiel, as these processes can be painfully slow.
The popular image of attrition is the Western
front of World War I, an unrelenting meat grinder
into which tens and hundreds of thousands of young
men were thrown to die for pitiful and pyrrhic territorial gains. Although this is not an accurate depiction of attrition as such, poorly directed attrition may
degenerate into such scenes, albeit not necessarily of
such magnitude as during World War I. Ironically, the
attrition of World War I often stemmed from recurring attempts of the generals to seek decisive battles
of annihilation by breaking through the fortified frontlines and, thereby, restore opportunities to maneuver.
It was often the quest for annihilation which begat
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the horrific scenes of attrition during World War I. A
more recent and less extreme example of attrition is
the Iran-Iraq war of 1980-1988.
American admiral and strategist J. C. Wylie
described the logic of attrition or exhaustion in a different manner, by instead labeling it “cumulative
strategy.” This is:
a type of warfare in which the entire pattern is made
up of a collection of lesser actions, but these lesser or
individual actions are not sequentially interdependent.
Each individual one is no more than a single statistic, an
isolated plus or minus, in arriving at the final result.34

Yet, the mechanism of effect is identical to that of attrition or exhaustion: the cumulative effect of warfare
upon the enemy. In the most advantageous circumstances, a cumulative strategy itself could lead to the
political and demographic annihilation of the enemy,
if he has not already surrendered, on the basis of the
impossibility of victory and of the human and financial cost of the war. Wylie identified the campaign
against Japan to have been on this track by the last
year of World War II due to the country’s totally vulnerable position after the United States established
control of the sea.
Yet not all military power is equivalent. Landpower, sea power, and air power are all unique within
the broader tent of military power. They share certain aspects of the logic of military power, fundamentally derived from their individual abilities to inflict
physical harm and damage upon an enemy, but their
unique geographies dictate variations in operation, as
well as in specific effects. The various forms of military power become versatile due to this variety, but
they also are not necessarily mutually exchangeable.
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Each can accomplish missions and achieve effects that
the others cannot, and each similarly has weaknesses
and limitations that the others do not.
This basic understanding of military power and its
possible modes of use indicates that military power
is an inherently flexible tool in what the French strategist André Beaufre terms “a contest for freedom of
action.”35 Military power can contest freedom of action
in various ways. It can engage quickly or it can attrite
slowly. It can attempt to crush in a single battle or to
whittle away over the course of innumerable engagements. It harbors both the promise of being a standalone instrument to achieve national policy and the
capability to be employed alongside other levers of
political power. As a strategic instrument, it is versatile in its employment.
The basic strategic purpose toward which this flexibility is used is to control. As naval historian Herbert
Rosinski argued, “It is this element of control which is the
essence of strategy: Control being the element which differentiates true strategic action from a haphazard series of
improvisations [italics in original].”36 Second, he noted,
“Comprehensive control of a field of action means a
concentration upon those minimum key lines of action
or key positions from which the entire field can be
positively controlled.”37 The more control one strategic actor has over the field, the greater his own freedom of action and the less his opponent enjoys, thus
shaping the pattern of adversarial interaction in war.
This assumes that control is positively taken, of which
military power—particularly Landpower—is capable.
Control may also be denied, and military power is
capable of achieving this standard as well.
However, it is only military power that can compel
or control. Through its use, a strategist may oblige the
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enemy to make a decision about continuing to engage
in hostilities or revert to making peace. As Wylie
argued, “the ultimate determinant in war is the man on
the scene with the gun. This man is the final power in
war. He is control. He determines who wins [italics in
original].”38 Yet, within the larger pattern of adversarial interaction in war, only Landpower has the potential to take control of that interaction. Sea power and
air power have the ability to deny that control to the
enemy, but those relying purely upon sea or air power
cannot impose their own control over the whole pattern of the war.39 Nevertheless, how the military
compels and controls is in the details of military operations, and it may occur through annihilation, attrition,
exhaustion, or at some point on the spectrum among
these ideals.
THE LOGIC OF NON-MILITARY POWER FROM
PEACETIME TO WARTIME
The logic of non-military power differs from that
of military power substantially. Whereas military
power compels, coerces, and controls, non-military
power primarily persuades and limits. The ability of
non-military instruments to compel, coerce, and control is restricted. Even coercive diplomacy is closer
to diplomacy than to coercion. As Gordon Craig and
Alexander George argued:
Coercive diplomacy needs to be distinguished from pure
coercion. It seeks to persuade the opponent to cease his
aggression rather than bludgeon him into stopping. In
contrast to the crude use of force to repel the opponent,
coercive diplomacy emphasizes the use of threats and the
exemplary use of limited force to persuade him to back
down [italics in original].40
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Such persuasive efforts take a long time to achieve
desired results, even in diplomacy between friendly
countries in non-adversarial contexts—such as
U.S.-European Union negotiations on the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership, which began
in 2013, and are not expected to be finalized until
2019-2020.
Furthermore, persuasive ways of influencing
behavior are largely inappropriate for the adversarial
climate of war. War engenders an adversarial mentality which encourages a disregard of persuasive means,
as each side strives to outdo the other in dealing reciprocal damage, within the limits of its own capabilities,
the limits imposed by its politics, and so forth. Thus,
one may safely suggest that if the logic of non-military
power is a certain way in peacetime, in wartime it is
necessarily more conditional, and perhaps even marginalized. This is why Clausewitz identifies combat
as the only means in war. “Only” is an exaggeration,
but persuasion can make its effects felt only after the
enemy has been weakened through combat, and his
will to continue fighting has begun to crack and flag.
When fighting enemies are comprised of multiple decision-making bodies, such as any coalition or alliance,
adroit diplomacy after sufficient combat may lead to
the withdrawal of a belligerent from the conflict. Thus,
diplomacy may serve in certain circumstances, like the
battles of annihilation described by Nolan, as accelerants of attrition. One need only think of the surrender
of Italy during World War II or the Sunni Awakening
during the Iraq War to see examples of how best to
employ the persuasive logic of diplomacy even within
war. The reduction of enemy manpower through
diplomacy is largely—but not entirely—functionally equivalent to a similar reduction through force
of arms. A dead man stays dead forevermore, but a
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man turned by diplomacy may not only remove his
strength from that of the enemy, but also add it to his
own.
Yet, if the logic of non-military power were limited to persuasion, then its role in war would remain
restricted. Fortunately, persuasion is not the only logic
through which non-military power may be applied, in
peace or war. Much like military power has an overall logic which is further conditioned by the specific
details of that power—Landpower, sea power, air
power, etc.—non-military power similarly may be
comprised of a more general logic under which is a
constellation of more particular logics. Whereas the
logic of military power is already well-understood,
both in general and in particular, the logic of non-military power is often better appreciated in the particular
rather than in the general. The logics of three forms
of non-military power are examined—economic sanctions, financial sanctions, and propaganda and fake
news—from which a more general appreciation of
non-military power is derived. As David Baldwin correctly observes, “The utility of a technique of statecraft
is a function of the situation and not a quality intrinsic
to the particular technique.”41 The particular logic(s)
of each form of non-military power below will not be
ascertained in a vacuum but, ultimately, with regard
to wartime utility.
Economic Sanctions
Of all forms of non-military power, the logic
of economic sanctions has drawn the most scholarly attention and debate, in part because sanctions
have remained particularly popular among Western
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policymakers as instruments of policy. In the context
of peacetime statecraft:
Economic measures are likely to exert more pressure
than either diplomacy or propaganda and are less likely
to evoke a violent response than military instruments.
In mixed motive games in which applying pressure and
avoiding the evocation of a violent response are both
important goals, economic tools are likely to be especially
attractive. In such situations economic sanctions are not
just ‘second-best’ techniques, but rather techniques that
promise to be effective in ways that military force could
not be.42

Although economic statecraft encompasses both positive inducements for behavior and negative sanctions against it, the climate of war discussed earlier
limits the utility of the former until diplomacy as
such becomes a viable method of engaging the enemy
again. Such being the case, the focus should be on the
negative dimensions of economic power—how can it
contribute to the warfighting itself?
Academic debate surrounding economic sanctions
identifies from actual practice three distinct logics
through which sanctions have been applied and been
expected to have effect. These are coercion, constraining, and signaling.43 The hypothesis concerning signaling logic suggests that the primary target of economic
sanctions is not the literal target of the sanctions but,
rather, a section of the international audience witnessing the sanctions and their effects. Although this
may be a valid logic in peacetime, it is less applicable in times of war for a number of reasons. First, in
war, the main audience that one wishes to affect is the
enemy himself. Second, given the relative weight of
military versus non-military power in the adversarial
climate of war, if one’s own military power and action
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cannot prevent an external audience from intervening
counter to one’s own interests, then the mere signaling of economic sanctions will also fail. Within the
context of grand strategy, of combining military and
non-military power in war, signaling is not a relevant
logic. This is not to deny that, within considerations of
broader statecraft beyond the war itself, signaling may
be a relevant logic, but it is still not part of grand strategy as here defined.
In the context of economic sanctions, coercion
refers to the ability of sanctions independently to
change the target’s policy. Economic coercion is:
the threat or act by a nation-state or coalition of nationstates, called the sender, to disrupt economic exchange
with another nation-state, called the target, unless the
targeted country acquiesces to an articulated political
demand [italics in original].44

The academic debate has gone back and forth over the
effectiveness of sanctions as an independent instrument of coercion. Robert Pape has starkly asserted,
“economic sanctions do not work.”45 T. Clifton Morgan
believes that:
We now know that sanctions are often effective, and
we have identified a number of factors that contribute
to, or detract from, their efficacy. We also know that
sanctions threats frequently work, and we suspect that
the credibility of these threats is bolstered by states’
demonstrated willingness to impose them.46

Daniel Drezner identifies the question of future diplomatic or economic conflict between the sender and the
target as a vital consideration for the latter in its reception of present economic sanctions and its response to
them.
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The target’s conflict expectations determine the
magnitude of concessions. Facing an adversarial sender,
the target will be worried about the long-run implications
of acquiescing. Because it expects frequent conflicts, the
target will be concerned about any concessions in the
present undercutting its bargaining position in future
interactions. The sender might exploit the material
or reputation effects from these concessions in later
conflicts.47

Discussion of sanctions as coercion focuses on the
question of peacetime sanctions as an independent
instrument of policy. This perspective is wholly inappropriate in war, simply because economic sanctions are neither coercively independent in hostilities
between two parties nor are they the only instrument
of policy. Moreover, returning to the adversarial climate of war, economic sanctions are also not the strategically or politically weightiest instrument, as military
power receives that distinction. If military power itself
has yet to break the enemy’s will to continue fighting,
then the application of economic sanctions will certainly not do so.
This leaves constraining as the final logic of economic sanctions. As Morgan observes:
We should view sanctions as an effort to have a direct
effect on the environment in which the target makes
its decision. All actions require resources: If sanctions
reduce the resources available to the target then the
target has to make some changes in its behavior. These
may or may not be the changes the sender wanted, but
that should depend at least partly on the specific design
of the sanctions, especially if many types of resources are
not fungible.48

Constraining is the universal logic of negative economic sanctions. Regardless of the intended logic by
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which sanctions are anticipated by policymakers to
take effect, such as signaling or coercion, sanctions
constrain. This is the source of their power as an instrument to affect the future. This is certainly a significant
logic in peacetime: “sanctions can be used to create
vulnerabilities that can later be exploited in negotiations,” as the use of economic sanctions against Libya
for nonproliferation purposes attests.49 Any coercive
or signaling potential that economic sanctions may
have stems from the fundamental ability of those sanctions to limit. The ability to limit the enemy’s present
and future access to resources may also be meaningful, even in the middle of a war. The maritime dimension of this constraining activity, naval blockade, has
a long history, especially in British hands. Limitation
itself through economic means usually cannot be decisive, but it can certainly be productively combined
with military power in war.
Besides the particular context of war, which naturally conditions the effect and effectiveness of economic sanctions, there is one other prerequisite for
sanctions to have any effect at all—in peace or in war.
Unlike military power, economic sanctions require
pre-existent economic ties between or among the
actors involved. Economic sanctions, even with a multilateral framework, interrupt inherently one or more
bilateral trade flows. The more significant the preexisting economic links were, the more effective sanctions may be, and the opposite is the case as well. This
simple fact naturally conditions the utility of economic
sanctions, whether in peace or in war.
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Financial Sanctions
Financial sanctions are one of the newest policy
instruments available, enabled by the context of a truly
global financial system. Strictly speaking an offshoot
of the broader category of economic sanctions, financial sanctions target the ability to move or store money
rather than the movement of trade. Economic statecraft in practice, especially in the West, has recently
been employing financial sanctions more regularly
than economic sanctions: “the United States and the
European Union have relied upon targeted financial
sanctions as their preferred instrument of statecraft.”50
Juan Zarate, an actual practitioner of financial warfare,
argued in 2013, “Over the past decade, the United
States has waged a new brand of financial warfare,
unprecedented in reach and effectiveness.”51 The academic debate on financial sanctions has yet to reach
full momentum, as attention is shifting only relatively
slowly from the more traditional forms of economic
power. As it remains a form of economic power, it
may still fall underneath the identified tripartite logic
of economic sanctions: signaling, coercion, and constraining. Signaling was already established as inappropriate for the context of war; therefore, only the
latter two logics are considered.
Much like economic sanctions, limitation is the
essential effect of financial sanctions. As one recent
article introduced the topic to a predominantly military audience, “Financial power is simply the means
to make warfare—or anything for that matter—more
or less costly.” More specifically, “Financial warfare
can, at a minimum, disrupt the monetary foundations underlying production and distribution and,
accordingly, disrupt an adversary’s ability to produce
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and distribute goods and services.”52 Zarate the practitioner similarly describes the effects of financial
sanctions.
In a series of financial pressure campaigns, the United
States has financially squeezed and isolated America’s
principal enemies of this period—Al Qaeda, North
Korea, Iran, Iraq, and Syria . . . these campaigns have
consisted of a novel set of financial strategies that harness
the international financial and commercial systems to
ostracize rogue actors and constrict their funding flows,
inflicting real pain.53

In the experience of the U.S. Treasury during the
global war on terrorism, financial sanctions could
indeed coerce. Yet it was not, for example, al-Qaeda
itself that was being coerced. Although al-Qaeda never
gave up its desire to attack the West, financial warfare
nevertheless posed a dual threat. First was the essential limitation imposed by financial sanctions:
By the time Osama bin Laden was killed, Treasury’s
work had paid off. Al Qaeda’s old financial networks had
been decimated, and the Al Qaeda core was pleading for
money from its affiliates and donors and trying to find
new ways to raise money.54

Moreover, although al-Qaeda was never coerced into
changing fundamental political perspectives, many of
its financiers were so coerced.
The Al Qaeda operatives did not exist in a vacuum.
They relied on an entire system and support structure.
The financial networks and the money were essential to
their ability to operate and for the movement to survive
in the long term. That support structure was made up of
different types of actors, with varying motivations and
vulnerabilities. For the financiers—who often were not
as ideologically committed to the cause as the terrorists
themselves—money was a factor, and they valued their
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bank accounts and businesses. They wanted and needed
to continue to do business across borders. Thus, we could
find ways of altering the decision making of those donors,
suppliers, and supporters who would value their ability
to continue to do business. If their access to the legitimate
commercial and financial systems were blocked, we
reasoned, then they might reduce their support, desist
for a time, or never provide support again. Any of these
would be good outcomes.55

The role of the dollar in the global economy is the
vital element in anticipating the effectiveness of U.S.
financial sanctions:
Financial isolation did not come from a classic tradebased sanction or law; nor did it derive from a UN
[United Nations] sanctions resolution. The bank had no
assets in the United States, and the United States had
not frozen $25 million. Instead, the essence of this power
came from banks’ decisions to stop doing business with
North Korea—prompted by the Treasury’s unilateral 311
action.56

The Treasury prompted but did not control the market
reaction against the target, whether al-Qaeda, Iran, or
North Korea. Banks dealing with such illicit money
faced a choice: do business with the enemy or with
the United States. Thus far, the choice for markets has
been easy. Yet, this extraterritorial reach is incumbent
upon the dollar’s central position in global finance,
which has endured thus far, despite both financial
warfare and financial crisis, but which is still coming
increasingly under threat.
The experience of financial warfare suggests that
it has the potential to be an independent instrument
of policy, as it has had effect in countries such as
Iran and North Korea. However, financial sanctions
have failed to change the policies of actors who are
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explicitly wholly adversarial, such as al-Qaeda. Nevertheless, financial sanctions still constrain the enemy
and degrade its operational capabilities, perhaps even
preventing it from carrying out some attacks altogether. As with other forms of non-military power, in
war, these forms of power are not meant to be independent; therefore, their fundamental contribution
should be seen through the lens of constraining the
enemy and his freedom of action.
Propaganda and Fake News
Propaganda has existed for at least 2,500 years, but
has become a major concern only in the past century
or so. Harold Lasswell defined it well during the interwar period:
Propaganda is the management of collective attitudes
by the manipulation of significant symbols. The word
attitude is taken to mean a tendency to act according to
certain patterns of valuation. The existence of an attitude
is not a direct datum of experience, but an inference from
signs which have a conventionalized significance.57

Since 2014, the debate about propaganda has focused
primarily on the issue of fake news.
Fake news is a concern for most, if not all, Western
policymakers. Some argue that it influenced the result
of the 2016 U.S. Presidential election. A North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) cooperative center of
excellence focused on strategic communication was
founded in Riga, Latvia, to lead NATO’s response to
fake news. Yet much of the current debate about fake
news focuses on the specific case of Russia and the
methods it uses, which include “deception, deflection
of responsibility, outright lies, and the creation of an
alternative reality.”58 There has been less theoretical
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discussion about the effects of fake news, as observers and analysts prefer to emphasize the current and
the specific over the general. Along these lines, Russia
analyst Keir Giles described Russia’s powerful fake
news narrative:
Western media organizations more broadly, as well as
the populations they serve, were entirely unprepared
in early 2014 for a targeted and consistent hostile
information campaign organized and resourced at state
level. The result was an initial startling success for the
Russian approach—exemplified in Crimea, where reports
from journalists on the scene identifying Russian troops
did not reach mainstream audiences because editors
in their newsrooms were baffled by the inexplicable
Russian denials. . . . This led at first to striking success in
penetration of narratives, which contributed powerfully
to Russia’s ability to prosecute operations against Ukraine
in the early stages of the conflict with little coordinated
opposition from the West. The fact that the EU [European
Union] continued to find itself unable to refer publicly to
the presence of Russian troops in Ukraine for almost a
year denoted a broader inability to challenge the Russian
version of events—without which a meaningful response
was impossible.59

Similarly, one of the early individual targets of Russian fake news, Finnish reporter Jessikka Aro, has
described how:
aggressive pro-Russia propaganda trolls [have] had an
impact on many Finns, on their attitudes and even their
actions: some had stopped discussing Russian politics
online; others had lost touch with what was true or false,
for example, about the war in Ukraine.60

From such specific discussion, it is possible to
derive observations about the effects of fake news in
general. The primary effect of fake news is to limit or
constrain the target’s freedom of action. This may be
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done by disrupting any competing, more truthful narratives, as occurred during the Crimean annexation. It
can also be done by:
supplying polluted information, exploiting the fact
that Western elected representatives receive and are
sensitive to the same information flows as their voters.
When disinformation delivered in this manner is part of
the framework for decisions, this constitutes success for
Moscow.61

Decision-making usually can be only as good as the
information that feeds into it.
This pollution of the information framework for decisionmaking is a key element of the long-established Soviet
and Russian principle of reflexive control—influencing
the decision of your adversary by ensuring that he is
supplied with specific information or disinformation on
which to base it.62

The logic of propaganda and fake news lies in the
manipulation of the information space, in which decision-makers exist and craft their policies to restrict the
target’s freedom of action, even if the target itself is
not actually aware of this restriction. Of all non-military forms of power, fake news and propaganda
are most compatible with non-attritional forms of
military power because they may directly influence
decision-making. Yet, such influence does not occur
immediately; it accumulates over time.
COMBINING MILITARY AND
NON-MILITARY POWER
To combine military and non-military power
effectively in wartime, one must be able to translate the effects of non-military power into a form
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comprehensible in the framework of strategy and
strategic theory. Clausewitz defined combat as the
only means in war. This is a slight exaggeration, but
combat is necessarily the primary means. In such a
context, non-military instruments may be useful only
inasmuch as they may mitigate the need for combat,
whether in the present or, more likely, in the future. In
translating the effects of non-military power into something comprehensible to strategy, a common thread
appears and runs through each of the instruments of
non-military power. Each is capable of restricting or
constraining the enemy. The instruments of non-military power may impose limits on the enemy, toward
which military power can then act to attrite the opponent. However, instruments of non-military power
cannot impose control upon the pattern of interaction
between adversaries—rather, they deny the enemy
control in war. The effects of instruments of non-military power accumulate over time; whether this occurs
quickly or slowly, it does not happen all at once. Yet
the fundamental question must be: What might such
combinations of military and non-military power
actually look like in practice?
Generic military power can either annihilate or
attrite; it can take and exercise control or deny control. Generic non-military power cannot annihilate;
it can only limit and attrite. Generic non-military
power cannot take and exercise control; it can only
deny control. If theory were to disregard the primacy
of practice, it would suggest that there are no special
implications to combining military and non-military
power. Military and non-military power merely work
together toward common political ends. This is the
implicit assumption in the many definitions of strategy that incorporate both military and non-military
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power beneath their wings, as they rarely, if ever,
distinguish among the varying instrumental logics
that must necessarily be at play among the variety of
included instruments.
In practice, however, the implications of combination are significant. Non-military power is unlike military power in its logic. It cannot be assumed to be able
to fulfill the same functions, certainly not in the same
way as military power, and so it cannot be treated in
the same manner. Combining these two distinct types
of power within a single concept is not as straightforward as simply including non-military instruments
into otherwise military-oriented definitions of grand
strategy. The mutual compatibility of military and
non-military instruments is low and contextual. The
inclusion of non-military instruments in a military
strategy has implications and reflects assumptions
about the future.
Military strategists often invoke grand strategy,
implicitly or explicitly, only when they judge annihilation to be implausible. Strategists prefer to avoid
employing non-military instruments if they do not
judge them necessary. The U.S. color war plans of the
interwar period are telling examples. War Plan Green,
which envisaged a fluid scenario in Mexico that might
require U.S. Army intervention to protect American
nationals, wholly disregarded non-military instruments.63 Similarly, War Plan Tan against Cuba did not
feature non-military instruments—the military alone
was judged sufficient for any task.64 In neither scenario
would there be sufficient time for non-military instruments to be brought to bear, let alone to take effect,
whether as a result of U.S. military effectiveness or
due to the inherent fluidity of the strategic situation at
hand. Non-military means were wholly irrelevant to

35

the strategic tasks that were anticipated in Mexico and
Cuba, to be performed quickly by the military alone.
Operation IRAQI FREEDOM in 2003 is another more
modern example of when the military was expected to
bring about such a quick result that any consideration
of non-military instruments was laid aside—although
this was informed as much by inappropriate political
assumptions about internal Iraqi security after the war
as by faith in military power.
In contrast to War Plans Green and Tan, in War
Plan Orange against Japan, the joint planners could
not overemphasize their desire to include non-military instruments in the anticipated war.
Mission for the Civil Power: To support the Armed Forces
in their operations; to prevent JAPAN from obtaining
any means of waging war from Neutral Countries and
to destroy JAPANESE credit in order to accomplish the
economic exhaustion of JAPAN.65

It contained an entire section (XVI) detailing “Cooperation with Other Government Departments,” which
contained a list of necessary actions by the relevant
government departments: exertion of economic and
financial pressure, including worldwide preclusive
purchase against Japan; exertion of pressure upon
neutral nations to prevent those nations from supplying means of waging war to Japan; stoppage of all
U.S. trade with Japan, but maintenance of U.S. foreign
trade; treatment of enemy merchant vessels in U.S.
ports upon outbreak of war; regulations for the declaration of contraband; control of enemy aliens and
property in the United States; required intelligence
service, including espionage and counterespionage;
censorship of communications and the press; and propaganda in support of the war.66 Finally, as a memo
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from the Joint Planning Committee to the Joint Board
argued, “It is considered that this section is of such
importance that there should be as little delay as possible in the appointment of the representative of the
various Government Departments.”67 The war against
Japan was expected to be protracted and arduous;
therefore, the long time horizons inherent in the use
of non-military power could be accommodated in the
overall grand strategy against Japan, thereby allowing
them the opportunity to achieve the desired limiting
effects.
Whereas War Plans Green and Tan demonstrated
where grand strategy appeared to be unnecessary and
War Plan Orange indicated under what circumstances
grand strategy was desirable, War Plan Red against
Great Britain revealed when it might be counterproductive. As the war planners observed:
The RED financial structure is strong and independent of
any BLUE banking interests. BLUE investments in Europe
at present have comparatively little effect in neutralizing
RED financial influence in that field, and the contingency
that they may some time do so, is considered remote. The
necessity which many European nations are now under
to pay interest on large loans to the BLUE government
and to BLUE private banking interests, will probably be
utilized by RED to mobilize sentiment in these nations in
her favor in a war with BLUE.68

That is, recourse to non-military instruments would
not only be ineffective but may actually be harmful to
the United States in any war with Great Britain. The
anticipated disadvantage was a question of non-British European diplomacy and political pressure limiting U.S. freedom of action in any hypothetical war.
A clear, albeit failed, example of the limiting and
attritional logics of non-military power in the form

37

of economic sanctions, and of military power in the
form of a cyber special operation, respectively, is the
sanctions and Stuxnet attack on Iran. Iran’s nuclear
program had been subject to sanctions and trade controls for some time prior to the Stuxnet attack as the
United States and other international actors sought to
slow the program down. These actors sought to constrain Iran’s freedom of action by limiting its potential
acquisition of necessary resources, particularly with
regard to its nuclear program, which in turn led Iran
to attempt to circumvent these limitations through
smuggling. As the other element in the strategic equation, special operations may be considered an instrument of attrition:
At the strategic level . . . special operations are less about
an epic Homeric raid than they are about the combined
effects of disparate unorthodox activities in the ebb and
flow of a campaign or series of campaigns.69

Stuxnet may be considered a special operation, perhaps the first of its kind, in cyberspace. Like more
physical special operations, it was essentially a single-shot attempt. There could be no repeat with the
same code (or mission plan).
The strategic picture is clear. Iran’s nuclear program was limited by external action, leading to a
relatively inflexible cap on the resources it could dedicate to expanding or sustaining the program. Iran at
the time was estimated to have stockpiled material to
build 12,000 to 15,000 early generation centrifuges, of
which 9,000 had already been deployed and were in
use at the Iranian nuclear facility at Natanz. Due to
Iranian unfamiliarity with nuclear technology at the
time and the poor quality of its early generation centrifuges, routine operation of its nuclear facilities led
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to an annual wastage of about 1,000 of these centrifuges. Iran’s limits appeared to be quite close, as Iran
had a buffer of only 2,000-5,000 centrifuges to replace
losses. Yet at this point, Iran still could replace the
losses—the limits Stuxnet imposed made the development of the nuclear program more difficult, but it did
not meaningfully impact its activity. More centrifuges
had to be destroyed for the imposed limits actually to
become significant. In Stuxnet, the West had an instrument that could possibly destroy Iranian centrifuges.
The tactical end result of the Stuxnet attack was that
another 1,000 centrifuges were destroyed at Natanz.
This hit the Iranian resource buffer, but did not overwhelm it. Although a tactical success for an innovative instrument, Stuxnet was not tactically successful
enough to provide the desired strategic consequence.70
Nevertheless, despite failure, the logic of combining
military and non-military power is clear.
The employment of non-military instruments in
war is primarily a question of imposing constraints
or limitations on the enemy’s freedom of action by
denying him access to resources. Limitations are often
insufficient to convince the target independently to
come to terms, especially in war, in which policymakers’ basic frame of reference focuses on the question
of combat and operational effectiveness and success.
Such being the case, limitations become relevant when
they are meaningful. What gives them meaning is
when the target (the enemy) requires resources to sustain its war effort which it can no longer acquire—or
acquire sufficiently easily for them to be reliable—due
to the limitations imposed by non-military instruments. In this context, the military aspect of grand
strategy is to push the enemy to, and beyond, those
limits. Strategy therefore turns to attrition, for which
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annihilation at best may only be an accelerant. Even
diplomatic events like the surrender of Italy in 1943 or
the Sunni Awakening only bring the limits closer to
the enemy by denying it resources and redirecting the
attrition toward other adversary groups. In this way,
too, even such diplomatic coups only take effect as
accelerants of attrition, albeit from the other direction
by pushing the breaking point closer to the ongoing
level of attrition.
ALSO TRUE FOR HYBRID WARFARE AND
UNRESTRICTED OR THREE WARFARES?
If the logic of grand strategy is inherently attritional due to its fundamental combination of military and non-military means, it stands to reason that
other strategic concepts which combine these unlike
forms of power must be similarly attritional. Other
forms of this combination exist, including Russia’s
so-called hybrid warfare and China’s unrestricted or
three warfares strategic theses. The logic of these two
combinations of military and non-military power will
be examined to determine whether or not they too are
attritional in nature. Of the two, Russian hybrid warfare has been practiced, but not theorized (at least not
by the Russians themselves, although much has been
written about hybrid warfare in the West), whereas
Chinese unrestricted warfare or three warfares has
been theorized, but not practiced up to the point of
actual war.
The Russians themselves are adamant that it was
the West that first practiced hybrid warfare:
there is a general consensus in Russian military circles
that hybrid war is a completely Western concept as
no Russian military officer or strategist has discussed

40

it, except to mention the West’s use of the term, or to
mention the West’s use of hybrid warfare against Russia.
. . . The Russian military has been adamant that they do
not practice a hybrid-war strategy.71

Hence, the Russians themselves have not explicitly
theorized on their own practice of hybrid warfare,
although their ruminations on the Western practice of
hybrid warfare reveal much about their own practice.
For an explicit discussion of the logic of hybrid warfare, one must turn to Western interpretations of Russian practice. Latvian analyst Jānis Bērziņš identifies
eight phases in Russian hybrid warfare, of which the
first four do not involve military force:
First
Phase:
non-military
asymmetric
warfare
(encompassing information, moral, psychological,
ideological, diplomatic, and economic measures as part
of a plan to establish a favorable political, economic, and
military setup).
Second Phase: special operations to mislead political and
military leaders by coordinated measures carried out by
diplomatic channels, media, and top government and
military agencies by leaking false data, orders, directives,
and instructions.
Third Phase: intimidation, deceiving, and bribing
government and military officers, with the objective of
making them abandon their service duties.
Fourth Phase: destabilizing propaganda to increase
discontent among the population, boosted by the arrival
of Russian bands of militants, escalating subversion
[emphasis in original].72

These first four phases are not inherently sequential; no phase is logically reliant on any previous
phase, they generally overlap, and they may occur
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simultaneously. These phases are intended to achieve
up to nine distinct outcomes:
i. Stimulation and support of armed actions by separatist
groups with the objective of promoting chaos and
territorial disintegration;
ii. Polarization between the elite and society, resulting in a
crisis of values followed by a process of reality orientation
to Western values;
iii. Demoralization of armed forces and military elite;
iv. Strategic controlled degradation of the socioeconomic
situation;
v. Stimulation of a socio-political crisis;
vi. Intensification of simultaneous forms and models of
psychological warfare;
vii. Incitement of mass panic, with the loss of confidence
in key government institutions;
viii. Defamation of political leaders who are not aligned
with Russia’s interests;
ix. Annihilation of possibilities to form coalitions with
foreign allies.73

These nine outcomes are all similar in that they restrict
the ability of the target government to act. If the state
is falling apart at the margins due to separatists, if its
government and public institutions are not trusted by
the people, if the armed forces are demoralized, etc.,
these factors all limit the freedom of action of the target
state. In other words, “The essence of Russia’s tactics
was precisely to try and avoid the need for shooting as much as possible, and then to try and ensure
that whatever shooting took place was on the terms
42

that suited them best.”74 That is, by the time Russia
is employing real military power, the opponent’s
options are ideally so limited that there is no realistic
choice other than acquiescence and surrender, simply
because the capacity for other action no longer exists.
This ideal was asymptotically achieved in Crimea, but
failed later in the Donbass.
It has long been suggested that China’s strategic
culture differs significantly from that of the West, a
difference that influences even fundamental concepts
of strategy. Rather than the Western model of means,
ways, and ends, the Chinese favor a condition-consequence approach, which “is a Chinese concept of efficacy that teaches one to learn how to allow an effect to
come about: not to aim for it directly, but to implicate it
as a consequence.”75 This implies that limitation of the
enemy’s freedom of action is the focus of the corpus of
Chinese strategic thought. This is achieved by manipulating the conditions in which the adversary acts in
such a manner that the enemy simply has no scope for
action except along the lines which China desires.
This imposition of limitation relies upon a longer-term insight into the future, as conditions that are
established earlier lead more naturally to the desired
consequences, in part because the target of these early-imposed restraints begins to accept such limitations
as immutable. Acting so early minimizes the amount
of effort eventually required to achieve the desired
goals.
China’s strategic culture encourages intervening subtly
in a situation long before armed conflict arrives to alter
the strategic landscape. Or, to translate the concept into
a Western context, by laying the groundwork in Phase
Zero the strategic landscape can be altered so that the
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objectives of the state can be achieved, and with minimal
fighting.76

It also serves to minimize the risk of failure in war
itself.
Chinese strategy aimed to use every possible means to
influence the potential inherent in the forces at play to its
own advantage, even before the actual engagement, so
that the engagement would never constitute the decisive
moment, which always involves risk.77

This upstream engagement of the target before it is
an actual enemy and the manipulation of the environment often cannot rely on military force but, rather, on
non-military power. China’s three warfares concept
identifies three main methods by which the People’s
Liberation Army may contribute to this task through
non-military means: psychological instruments, public
opinion, and legal instruments.78 The goal of the use
of these means and methods is to increase one’s own
freedom of action and limit that of the opponent, and
they may easily be used in conjunction with other
non-military instruments, such as economic power.
One clear distinction emerges between Russian
hybrid warfare and China’s three warfares on one
hand versus the Western version of grand strategy as
multiple instruments of power in war on the other.
This difference is timing. In this Western notion of
grand strategy, military and non-military power are
combined in war, with relatively little thought given
to pre-war, non-military efforts to make the ensuing
war easier. Perhaps only J. F. C. Fuller’s and Edward
Mead Earle’s individual conceptions of grand strategy addressed this point, in different ways, but both
tended to focus more on arming the nation to prepare
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for war rather than weakening and limiting the prospective enemy—a defensive rather than aggressive concept. In contrast, in both theory and practice,
Russia and China have exported their use of non-military instruments into the era of peace leading up to
a potential armed conflict to shape the environment
to suit their own interests best by limiting what their
potential opponents may be able to do. As the Russian
propaganda network RT’s editor-in-chief, Margarita
Simonyan, stated by way of comparing RT to the Ministry of Defense:
Of course, the Defense Ministry can’t start training
soldiers, preparing weaponry and generally making itself
from scratch when the war already started. If we don’t
have an audience today, tomorrow and the day after, it’ll
be the same as in 2008.79

This is a key difference, because it shifts forward
the timing of attrition, of when the effect of non-military power accumulates. It is both a relatively safe
and a relatively easy way to influence the strategic
environment because it occurs substantially before an
adversarial relationship, such as that between Russia
and the West, is established. It is a more deliberate
use of non-military power than occurs in war because
it establishes the most beneficial conditions for war
in advance. Thus, it may perhaps be suitable or even
available as a policy option, only for revisionist
powers, as those interested in the status quo are also
inherently disinterested in initiating war.
Regarding the effect of non-military power, its
logic endures whether in war or in peace when it is
combined, simultaneously or sequentially, with military power. It imposes identifiable limits on the opponent, which may then be reached by military power
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through attrition or exhaustion. Nonetheless, limits
imposed through the sustained peacetime use of
non-military power may ultimately prove to be quite
tight, and the attrition or exhaustion necessary to succeed may be relatively low, as seen in Crimea, a campaign that was the ideal case for hybrid warfare, but it
is unlikely to be repeatable.
CONCLUSION
Grand strategy is often invoked within strategic
studies and related disciplines, less often defined,
and almost never explored at the level of conceptual
logic. Yet, the conceptual logic of grand strategy matters, as it is this logical level that determines how the
various component forms of power fit together. This
is true especially of the interpretations of grand strategy—as well as of strategy in general—which particularly emphasize combining multiple forms of power.
Yet this logic is not limited to these concepts of grand
strategy only, as even more recent definitions of grand
strategy implicitly assume such combination, albeit
the amalgamation of various forms of power is now
often considered mundane. However, recent Western
strategic experience suggests that combining military
and non-military power is hardly a mundane task. It is
difficult to do and when others do it successfully, the
West is usually surprised. It is therefore necessary to
delve into the conceptual logic of grand strategy.
Combining military and non-military means is an
action with important consequences for how these
very different forms of power actually achieve strategic and political effect when employed in tandem. The
logic of military power is flexible, it may annihilate or
attrite, it may take and exercise control or deny it, and
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it may be used sequentially or cumulatively. Military
power has the capacity to be an independent instrument of policy achievement. Non-military power is
more limited in its instrumental logic: it may impose
limits, it may deny freedom of action and control, and
it accumulates over time. The deliberate combination
of military force with non-military power reveals a
basic, strategic assumption about the military in that
particular context—that it will not be able to achieve a
quick victory. After all, if military power could achieve
quick success, then non-military power would clearly
be unnecessary. Fundamentally, therefore, the logic
of using both military and non-military means within
the same adversarial contest turns that conflict into an
attritional struggle, as it is only within an attritional
situation that non-military means can have any strategic or political significance at all. Grand strategy is
attritional. When U.S. strategists embark upon grand
strategy, rather than simply strategy, they are essentially, if implicitly, anticipating and committing to a
longer war, with implications for the deployment and
employment of the one element on which the whole
logic of combining multiple instruments of power
most often rests—Landpower in war.
Just as the West has been stumbling in its employment of military force and its combination of military and non-military power, potential rivals have
expended considerable effort to combine such unlike
forms of power productively. Russia’s hybrid warfare and China’s three warfares represent these countries’ own idiosyncratic attempts to combine military
and non-military power. The forms differ from that
of Western grand strategy, as their revisionist agendas allow them advantageously to apply non-military power in peacetime, before an openly adversarial
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relationship is established, to prepare the battlespace.
This allows them to impose potentially tight limits on
their opponent’s resources, political will, and freedom of action, which in turn may enable the military
to achieve campaigns that are essentially attritional,
yet also quite quick. Nevertheless, such innovations
merely displace the attrition from wartime to peacetime, rather than eliminating it altogether.
If the West wishes to improve the quality of its
grand strategies, it must cease to consider the combination of military and non-military power as mundane, as a quality of strategy that may be taken for
granted. It cannot be taken for granted—it is challenging, and the West has not done it well in the recent
past. The task of combining unlike forms of power is
sufficiently daunting, conceptually and practically, to
be considered “grand” all on its own, without needing to elevate strategy above policy or to rarify it as a
grand scheme about how we should interact with the
rest of the world.
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